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faulty readings and others may be controlled by a malicious attacker. Different from previous works, in this
paper we aim to distinguish between faults and attacks and develop an attack detection algorithm for the latter
only. To do this, we note that there are two kinds of faults – transient and permanent; the former are benign
and short-lived whereas the latter may have dangerous consequences on system performance.We argue that
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This paper is concerned with the security of modern Cyber-Physical Systems in the presence of transient
sensor faults. We consider a system with multiple sensors measuring the same physical variable, where
each sensor provides an interval with all possible values of the true state. We note that some sensors might
output faulty readings and others may be controlled by a malicious attacker. Different from previous works,
in this paper we aim to distinguish between faults and attacks and develop an attack detection algorithm for
the latter only. To do this, we note that there are two kinds of faults – transient and permanent; the former
are benign and short-lived whereas the latter may have dangerous consequences on system performance. We
argue that sensors have an underlying transient fault model that quantifies the amount of time in which
transient faults can occur. In addition, we provide a framework for developing such a model if it is not
provided by manufacturers.
Attacks can manifest as either transient or permanent faults depending on the attacker’s goal. We pro-
vide different techniques for handling each kind. For the former, we analyze the worst-case performance of
sensor fusion over time given each sensor’s transient fault model and develop a filtered fusion interval that
is guaranteed to contain the true value and is bounded in size. To deal with attacks that do not comply with
sensors’ transient fault models, we propose a sound attack detection algorithm based on pairwise inconsis-
tencies between sensor measurements. Finally, we provide a real-data case study on an unmanned ground
vehicle to evaluate the various aspects of this paper.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.3 [Special-purpose and Application-based Systems]: Process
control systems, Real-time and embedded systems; K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: Unauthorized access
(e.g., hacking, phreaking)
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cyber-Physical Systems security; sensor fusion; fault-tolerance; fault-
tolerant algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
Many Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are vulnerable to security breaches and are in-
creasingly being subjected to attacks. Recent developments have shown that it is possi-
ble for an attacker to hijack such a system by exploiting vulnerabilities in its on-board
communication protocol [Checkoway et al. 2011; Koscher et al. 2010; Greenberg 2015]
or through sensor spoofing [Rutkin 2014; Warner and Johnston 2002]. Weaknesses in
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have also been used as
a channel to disrupting critical infrastructure [Falliere et al. 2011]. Therefore, it is
imperative that these systems are designed in a secure and resilient fashion so as to
guarantee their proper functionality.
1Preliminary version of some of the results in this paper appeared in [Park et al. 2015].
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As a step towards the design of resilient CPS, in this work we focus on ways to im-
prove their resiliency to sensor attacks. We assume that some of the system’s sensors
may be compromised by a malicious attacker; the attacker can then send any measure-
ments on behalf of those sensors. As shown in previous work [Rutkin 2014; Warner and
Johnston 2002], sensor attacks alone are sufficient to severely affect a system’s opera-
tion, e.g., drastically disrupt its localization and lead it off the desired course. Thus, the
goal of this work is to develop algorithms that guarantee proper system performance
even in the presence of sensor attacks.
One way to address this problem is to utilize the increased diversity and reduced
price of modern sensing technology, which have made it possible to equip CPS with
multiple sensors. Not only can these systems measure variables that were not mea-
sured before (e.g., electric currents in batteries) but there also exist multiple sensors
that can estimate the same physical variable (e.g., GPS, wheel encoders and IMU’s
can all provide velocity measurements). Fusing their measurements increases both
the robustness to external disturbances (e.g., moving uphill) and the confidence in the
obtained estimate [Luo et al. 2002]. This paper shows that such redundant information
can also be used to cope with sensor attacks and proposes an attack-resilient sensor
fusion framework.
The first aspect to be considered for such a framework is the underlying sensor
model. There are two main sensor models used in the literature – probabilistic and
abstract. In the former, each sensor measurement is corrupted by stochastic noise
(e.g., Gaussian [Kalman 1960]). In the latter, an interval is constructed around the
measurement containing all possible values of the true state (e.g., set membership
approaches [Milanese and Novara 2004]). While the probabilistic approach is well
suited for the analysis of the system’s expected operation, it is not a good fit for worst-
case analysis such as attack detection; furthermore, it requires knowledge of the noise
distribution, where wrong assumptions may introduce vulnerabilities that can be ex-
ploited by an attacker. The abstract model, on the other hand, makes no assumptions
about the distribution of the noise and thus naturally lends itself to worst-case analy-
sis.
Since in this paper we consider the problem of CPS security, usually addressed using
worst-case reasoning, we adopt the abstract sensor model. Previous works employing
the abstract model [Marzullo 1990; Jayasimha 1994] consider the case where the num-
ber of faulty sensors (i.e., providing intervals that do not contain the true value) can
be bounded; they provide theoretical bounds on the output of sensor fusion in such a
scenario. An attack-resilient extension of [Marzullo 1990] has been developed by in-
troducing a sensor transmission schedule [Ivanov et al. 2014a] and by using measure-
ment history [Ivanov et al. 2014b]. A primary limitation of existing fault and attack
detection methods [Marzullo 1990; Jayasimha 1994; Ivanov et al. 2014a] is that they
treat attacks and faults in the same way. However, it is possible for a sensor to experi-
ence a transient fault, i.e., provide wrong measurements for a short period of time and
recover on its own, in which case the system should keep using it in the future.
Transient faults are a normal part of a sensor’s operation. They are often due to
temporary adverse conditions (e.g., a tunnel for GPS) but usually disappear quickly
and are not considered a threat for the system’s security. Thus, most sensors have a
transient fault model that bounds the time in which they can provide wrong data. On
the other hand, non-transient (or permanent) faults (e.g., a bias caused by a physically
damaged sensor) occur for a longer period of time, and are thus more dangerous and
can have catastrophic consequences. If systems cannot compensate for such faults in
software, they would benefit from removing the sensor’s measurements altogether.
Sensor attacks can manifest as either transient or non-transient (possibly Byzan-
tine) faults, depending on the attacker’s goals and capabilities. Masking a sensor’s
measurements as a transient fault may prevent the attacker from being discovered
but limits his capabilities. On the other hand, if the attacked measurements are con-
sistently wrong and resemble a permanent fault, they may inflict more damage but
may be detected quickly. In this paper, we analyze both kinds of attacks and guard
against their possible effecs: we propose 1) a detector for the more dangerous, but eas-
ier to detect, kind of attacks and 2) a filtering algorithm whose output is robust to
the more stealthy attacks, i.e., it is guaranteed to contain the true value even in the
presence of undetected stealthy attacks.
To distinguish between attacks and faults and to quantify the stealth of an attack,
we make use of sensor transient fault models (TFMs) that are now being provided by
some manufacturers [Frehse et al. 2014]. Such a model consists of three dimensions:
(1) interval size, (2) window size, and (3) number of allowed faulty measurements per
window. At the same time, such specifications are not always available, so the first
contribution of this paper is a method for selecting the three parameters based on
observed training data. We illustrate this with a real-data study using a ground vehicle
called the LandShark [Black-I Robotics 2015].
Once such TFMs are available, we examine their effect on the performance of sen-
sor fusion over time (as described in Section 3, we adopt a sensor fusion algorithm
initially developed by [Marzullo 1990] and extended by [Ivanov et al. 2014a; 2014b]).
We present results showing what is the worst-case number of rounds, in which sensor
fusion cannot make any guarantees about its output. We then provide a filtered sen-
sor fusion algorithm that is robust to this worst case and outputs a conservative, but
bounded, interval that is guaranteed to contain the true value. This worst-case result
also holds in the presence of attacks that appear as transient faults.
To deal with the more immediately disruptive class of attacks that manifest as per-
manent faults, we propose a detection and identification algorithm for sensors that
do not comply with their TFM’s. The algorithm uses pairwise relationships between
sensors – if two sensors’ measurements are too distant from each other, then one of
them must be wrong. By accumulating this information over time, we develop a sound
algorithm for attack detection and identification.
Finally, we illustrate the performance of the proposed solutions on a real-data case
study using the LandShark. In particular, we show the performance of the attack de-
tection/identification algorithm in the form of false alarm and detection rates and show
its advantage over the current sensor fusion technique. We also analyze the effect of
the TFM on sensor fusion and show the benefit of the filtered fusion interval.
The contributions of this paper over our preliminary work [Park et al. 2015] are as
follows: (1) a framework both for detecting/identifying attacks that manifest as per-
manent sensor faults as well as for providing resilience to the stealthy kind of attacks
that appear as transient faults; (2) worst-case analysis of the effect of TFMs on the
performance of sensor fusion; (3) the introduction of the filtered fusion interval whose
output is guaranteed to contain the true value; (4) experimental validation of the new
contributions using an unmanned ground vehicle (presented in Section 7.2).
2. RELATED WORK
This section describes related work on fault and attack detection with different sen-
sor models, contrasting the attack detection methods to the traditional fault detection
ones.
2.1. Sensor Model
For the detection of sensor faults and attacks, the first thing to consider is the underly-
ing sensor model because different sensor models lead to different approaches to detec-
tion. Most sensor models used in the literature fall into two general categories: prob-
abilistic sensor models and abstract sensor models. The probabilistic sensor models
assume a probability distribution of the sensor noise (e.g., Gaussian [Kalman 1960]).
The noise distribution puts more weight on the points which are more likely to be the
true value. Thus, probabilistic sensor models are well suited for the analysis of the
expected system performance [Kalman 1960; Xiao et al. 2005], but require knowledge
of noise distribution, where detectors designed under wrong noise assumptions are
well-known to have decreased (attack) detection accuracy [Willsky 1976]. On the other
hand, in the abstract sensor model, a measurement is an interval which contains all
points that may be true value (e.g., set membership approaches [Milanese and Novara
2004]). This type of sensor models assumes no knowledge of the noise distribution on
the interval, but construct such intervals to contain the unknown true value even in
the worst case. Since abstract measurements are the worst case bounds for the true
value, they are well-suited for worst case analysis of system operation under Byzantine
faults and sensor attacks [Marzullo 1990; Ivanov et al. 2014a; 2014b].
2.2. Fault Detection
There exists a large body of literature in the sensor fault detection and isolation do-
main with probabilistic sensors, including multiple well-written and exhaustive survey
papers, e.g., [Chen and Patton 2012; Frank 1990; Frank and Ding 1997; Hwang et al.
2010] and references within. The common theme among fault detection techniques is
that they either assume a prior on the initial condition [Isermann 1984] or a certain
model in which faults could occur [Joshi et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2006]. The former
type is referred to as a “change detector” in which large deviations from expected be-
havior are flagged as faults [Basseville et al. 1993]. In the latter, the assumed failure
models include jump systems [Davis 1975], probability of occurrence of faults [Willsky
1976] (or probability of missing measurements altogether [Sinopoli et al. 2004]), and
known directions in the state space where faults may occur [Willsky 1976]. Approaches
also exist to distinguish between transient and persistent faults, e.g., [Serafini et al.
2007; Lee and Choi 2008; Serafini et al. 2011], and to provide trust assessment of
sensors [De Kerchove and Van Dooren 2010; Rezvani et al. 2015]. Finally, a powerful
technique is the utilization of sensor redundancy [Kim et al. 2010].
With the abstract sensor model, fault detection is usually performed by using sensor
redundancy and a voting system on the provided intervals [Marzullo 1990; Jayasimha
1994]. While some algorithms are more conservative and provide guarantees that the
output of sensor fusion contain the true value (hence, their fault detection perfor-
mance may suffer), others relax these worst-case guarantees in favor of better perfor-
mance [Brooks and Iyengar 1996]. Other works also suggest imposing a distribution
on the provided interval so that a hybrid abstract-probabilistic analysis may be per-
formed [Zhu and Li 2006]. Finally, in addition to the one-dimensional intervals that
are assumed by the above, sensors can be also assumed to provide multidimensional
hyper-rectangles [Chew and Marzullo 1991], polyhedra [Ivanov et al. 2014b], or more
general sets [Milanese and Novara 2004; 2011].
2.3. Attack Detection
In contrast to traditional fault detection and isolation, attack detection works in gen-
eral involve worst-case analysis [Fawzi et al. 2011] because wrong model assumptions
can introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited [Pajic et al. 2014]. Attack detection
papers try to minimize the prior assumptions in an attempt to address a wider va-
riety of possible attacks; thus, the abstract sensor model (or more generally, the set
membership model) is almost exclusively the model of choice, except when the initial
condition and system dynamics are known [Rezvani et al. 2015; Teixeira et al. 2012].
In the abstract sensor domain, an attack-resilient extension to [Marzullo 1990] has
been developed [Ivanov et al. 2014a; 2014b]. [Ivanov et al. 2014a] introduces the use
of sensor transmission schedules in order to limit the attacker’s available information,
thus reducing the attacker’s capabilities. [Ivanov et al. 2014b] improves the accuracy of
sensor fusion by incorporating historical measurements, thus providing a better attack
detection.
A major shortcoming of the attack detection works [Marzullo 1990; Jayasimha 1994;
Ivanov et al. 2014a] is that they conservatively treat mere faults as attacks. While
there exist papers distinguishing attacks from faults [Basile et al. 2006], they make
specific assumptions about the form or direction of faults/attacks, thus being unsuit-
able for our problem. To overcome this issue, in our preliminary work [Park et al. 2015],
we presented an attack detection method differentiating transient faults from attacks
based on a transient fault model bounding the number of faulty measurements in any
given window (without assuming anything about how these faults might manifest).
This paper extends our initial study [Park et al. 2015] and our previous work on in-
corporating measurement history [Ivanov et al. 2014b] by adding a new sensor fusion
algorithm considering the effect of the transient fault model, thus providing an overall
framework for attack detection in the presence of transient faults.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section presents the problems considered in this work. It begins by explaining
the system and sensor models, including the transient fault model. It then introduces
attacks and analyzes the possible means and goals of an attacker. Finally, the problem
statements are presented.
3.1. System Model
The considered system consists of n sensors that can be used to estimate the same
physical variable (e.g., velocity). The system executes in a periodic fashion during T
time rounds (the total time of the system’s operation) – at each round sensors transmit
their measurements to a centralized estimator; it then performs sensor fusion and
attack detection/identification.
As described above, we adopt the abstract sensor model, in which each sensor pro-
vides an interval of possible values [Marzullo 1990]. For each sensor si, the interval is
constructed symmetrically around its measurement at time t, denoted by y(t)i ; the in-
terval’s length is twice the size of si’s error bound, i, which can be obtained from man-
ufacturer guarantees and physical limitations such as sampling jitter [Frehse et al.
2014]. However, due to external disturbances (e.g., rough terrain) and other reasons,
sensors sometimes provide faulty measurements that are outside of their predefined
bounds, hence their intervals may not contain the true value. We formally define the
predicate F (i, t) of sensor index i and time t as follows, to denote that sensor i provides
a faulty measurement at time t:
Definition 3.1 (Faulty Measurement). For any sensor index 1 ≤ i ≤ n and time 1 ≤
t ≤ T ,
F (i, t) ≡ |y(t)i − θ(t)| > i. (1)
where θ(t) is the true value. We say that sensor i provides a faulty measurement at
time t iff F (i, t) holds.
3.2. Transient Fault Model
By their nature, faulty measurements occur infrequently and usually do not indi-
cate a permanent problem with the sensor. To reflect this feature and motivated
by recent manufacturer trends to provide faulty-measurements-per-window specifica-
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Fig. 1: An example of fusion intervals for three different rounds.
tions [Frehse et al. 2014], we introduce the notion of a sensor’s transient fault model
(TFM). A TFM for a sensor si is a triple (i, ei, wi), where i is the error bound and
(ei, wi) is a transient threshold specifying that si can output at most ei faulty measure-
ments in any window of wi measurements. If si complies with its TFM, then any faulty
measurements are deemed transient faults. Otherwise, it is non-transiently faulty, de-
noted by the predicate NTF (i, t) of sensor index i and time t.
Definition 3.2 (Non-Transiently Faulty Sensor). For any sensor index 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
time 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
NTF (i, t) ≡
(
t∑
t′=t−wi+1
F1(i, t
′)
)
> ei, (2)
where F1(i, t) = 1 if F (i, t), and F1(i, t) = 0 if ¬F (i, t). We say that sensor i is non-
transiently faulty at time t iff NTF (i, t) holds.
3.3. Sensor Fusion
Since the true value is not known in practice, one can use the redundant sensor in-
formation to get an estimate of where it might be. One of the first works to develop
sensor fusion with abstract sensors [Marzullo 1990] assumes an upper bound on the
number of faulty measurements at any round, f , and outputs a fusion interval that is
guaranteed to contain the true value. The fusion interval is computed at each round
as the smallest interval that contains all points that lie in at least n− f intervals. In-
tuitively, since there are at least n− f correct intervals, the true value may lie in any
such group, thus all of them are included. Fig. 1 presents example fusion intervals in a
system with four sensors and f = 1. At each round, the fusion interval is the smallest
interval containing all points that lie in at least three intervals.
The fusion interval is used for worst-case analysis. For instance, the system is con-
sidered safe if the fusion interval does not contain any undesired states (since it is
guaranteed to contain the true value). Two results that will be used throughout this
paper are as follows: if f < dn/2e then the fusion interval is bounded by the size of
some sensor’s interval; otherwise, the fusion interval can be arbitrarily large [Marzullo
1990].
3.4. Attack Model
In this work we assume that sensors may not only provide faulty measurements but
may also be compromised by attacks. A malicious attacker may gain control of a sensor
and send any measurement on its behalf. This subsection describes how and why a
sensor attack might be performed and what its effect on system performance may be.
3.4.1. Attack Goals and Means. CPS may be subject to sensor attacks for a variety of
reasons. The advancement of robotics research has made it possible to use unmanned
vehicles to perform critical missions on enemy territory; as shown in the case of the
RQ-170 Sentinel drone captured in Iran [Peterson and Faramarzi 2011; Shepard et al.
2012], it is possible to compromise these systems’ sensors and disrupt their operation.
Additionally, as described in [Checkoway et al. 2011; Koscher et al. 2010], an attacker
(e.g., a former employee or a market competitor) could greatly disrupt the performance
of a modern automobile by corrupting a single electronic control unit. In both cases,
sensor attacks could lead to a complete takeover or even destruction of the respective
system.
There are multiple ways for an attacker to compromise a given sensor. One option is
through a physical attack, e.g., unplugging a sensor and replacing its software or using
other physical means [Shoukry et al. 2013]. Additionally, modern sensors have com-
plex software modules that may be vulnerable to cyber attacks through weaknesses
exposed in code (e.g., buffer overflow). Thus, as discussed in [Checkoway et al. 2011;
Koscher et al. 2010], an attacker could gain access to a sensor over the network with-
out even requiring physical proximity. Note that there exist other kinds of possible
attacks such as Sybil [Douceur 2002], denial of service or energy draining attacks that
might prevent a sensor from operating altogether. However, in this work we focus on
attacks that only modify sensor readings but do not affect their arrival times or lack
thereof. Analyzing the effect of other classes of attacks is part of future work.
At the same time, we argue that it may not be possible to compromise all sensors
on a given system. Some sensors may be more difficult to compromise than others. In
particular, certain sensors are attached to other platforms (e.g., wheel encoder) and
cannot be tampered without affecting critical components (e.g., the entire wheel); how-
ever, such actions could be detected and reported by an on-board diagnostics system.
Similarly, cyber attacks require significant efforts and knowledge of a sensor’s spe-
cific implementation. Therefore, in this work we assume that some sensors might be
maliciously attacked while others are not attacked but may be sometimes transiently
faulty.
3.4.2. Attack Detection and Consequences. Whether and when an attack is detected de-
pends first and foremost on the detection algorithm used by the system. As argued
above and in Section 2, in this work we use the abstract sensor model and the sensor
fusion algorithm presented in Section 3.3.
The way attacks are detected in this algorithm is by checking if an interval intersects
the fusion interval. Any interval not intersecting the fusion interval cannot contain the
true value (since the true value lies in the fusion interval). Thus, in Fig. 1 sensors s4, s2
and s3 would be detected as attacked in rounds 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The limitation
of this algorithm is that it treats attacks and faults in the same manner. While it
may be true that s4 is attacked in Fig. 1, it may also be the case that it experienced a
transient fault but recovered shortly afterwards.
This poses the question of how to formalize attacks and distinguish them from faults.
Of course, for any definition of a fault, it is possible for an attacker to mask his mea-
surements as a fault in order to avoid detection; it is even possible for the attacker
to just relay the actual sensor measurements. Therefore, in this paper we focus on
the detection of attacks that manifest as the most disruptive kind of faults, namely
non-transient faults.
Attacks that manifest as transient faults also pose a threat to the system, hence
they are addressed as well. However, rather than detecting such attacks, which would
also cause unnecessary detections of transient faults, we use the fact that they are ac-
tually bounded by the definition of transient faults, i.e., at most ei faulty (or attacked)
measurements can be provided in any window of size wi. By utilizing this informa-
tion, we can develop both an algorithm for the detection of attacks that manifest as
non-transient faults and an algorithm for deriving a fusion interval that is robust to
the stealthy attacks that appear as transient faults. To avoid confusion, in the remain-
der of the paper an attacked sensor is equivalent to a non-transient fault only. Thus
we formally the predicate A(i) of sensor index i as follows, to denote that sensor i is
attacked:
Definition 3.3 (Attacked Sensor). For any sensor index 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
A(i) ≡ ∃t ≤ T,NTF (i, t). (3)
We say that sensor i is attacked iff A(i) holds.
3.5. Problem Statements
There are three problems addressed in this work. The first one arises from the fact
that TFM’s are not widely available for current sensors and are not straightforward to
obtain.
PROBLEM 1. Given a system with n sensors and a set of training measurement data,
develop a transient fault model for each sensor si.
We note that once a TFM is introduced, the analysis of sensor fusion changes as well.
In particular, the assumption that at most f sensors provide faulty measurements in
a given round cannot be justified since it is possible that all sensors provide faulty
measurements in one round and are all correct in the next without violating their
respective TFM’s. Note that in this problem attacks are not yet considered.
PROBLEM 2. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (i, ei, wi)
for each sensor, analyze the performance of sensor fusion over time.
Finally, we introduce sensor attacks and develop an algorithm for attack detection
and identification.
PROBLEM 3. Given a system with n sensors and a transient fault model (i, ei, wi)
for each sensor, develop an algorithm to detect the existence of an attacked sensor and
possibly identify which sensor is under attack.
4. TFM PARAMETER SELECTION
This section describes a framework to choose the TFM parameters. As mentioned ear-
lier, manufacturers are transitioning towards providing transient fault specifications
for their sensors to allow for more realistic analysis [Frehse et al. 2014]. However,
when the TFM of a sensor is not provided, it is necessary to identify the TFM param-
eters from empirical data. Unlike probabilistic sensor models, abstract sensor models
are required to contain the true value in the interval except in the case of a faulty mea-
surement. Thus, statistical approaches to parameter selection (e.g., the best-fit Poisson
process) are unsuitable because they estimate parameters to maximally explain the
data, thus not providing worst-case bounds. Therefore, we provide a new method for
selecting the TFM parameters from empirical data. It is important to note that while
the training data is assumed to contain no attacks, no assumptions are made about
the presence of faulty measurements.
To empirically identify the TFM parameters, we apply the following procedure. First,
we gather sensor measurements with known true value θ(t) as training data (e.g., by
applying a constant input to an automotive CPS and adjusting for the bias in the
input-output speed relation). Next, we examine the data and identify the set of feasible
parameters (, e, w) by sliding a window of size w and finding the worst-case number
of faulty measurements e in a window for different values of .
For a fixed window size w, intuitively, there exists a relation between  and e. Sup-
pose that we plot the proportion of the number of faulty measurements in a window
Fig. 2: Sample plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against the error
bound ().
(e/w) against  (Fig. 2 shows possible examples of such curves for different window
sizes). Then, there can be observed a few interesting patterns. To begin with, there is a
large enough  such that no faulty measurements can ever be observed (i.e., e = 0). As
 is decreased from that point, the number of faulty measurements should slowly in-
crease. The increase rate should be relatively moderate while  is in the range of under-
lying true TFM. In other words, e increases in a relatively constant rate as  decreases,
because  gradually excludes more faulty measurements that occur transiently. Once
 passes a certain threshold, it enters the range of the underlying noise model where
most of the sensor measurements lie. Thus, as  decreases from this threshold, the
number of measurements that are deemed faulty increases rapidly. We refer to the
threshold as a “knee point”.
We argue that the knee points should be selected as the values for the TFM. On the
one hand, they are outside of the sensor’s underlying noise model, thus not making
noisy measurements be flagged as faulty. On the other, they are smaller than the sen-
sor’s underlying TFM, thus forcing most faulty measurements to be declared as such.
Consequently, the knee points govern the choice of  and e for any window size w. Note
that the right window size depends on the purpose for which it is used; a larger window
size will better capture the true TFM; as will be apparent, however, sometimes it may
increase the time necessary to detect an abnormality. Section 7 provides a real-data
illustration of this process.
5. EFFECT OF TFM ON SENSOR FUSION PERFORMANCE
Having provided a framework for selecting the TFM parameters, in this section we
analyze their effect on the worst-case performance of sensor fusion. In addition, we
illustrate how to compute a filtered fusion interval that is robust to this worst-case
scenario. We only consider stealthy attacks in this analysis – the theory on attack de-
tection/identification is presented in the next section. Thus, in this section we assume
that all sensors comply with their respective TFM’s.
5.1. Precision vs. Accuracy of the Fusion Interval
We begin by noting that the assumption of at most f faulty measurements per round
that is required in the original sensor fusion algorithm no longer holds. This is due to
the fact that each TFM only quantifies one sensor’s output in isolation from the others.
Thus, it is possible that all sensors2 provide faulty measurements in a single round or
that all are correct in a single round. Therefore, f can now be considered as an input
parameter to the fusion algorithm as opposed to a preliminary assumption. Note that
if f is smaller than the actual number of faulty measurements per round, the resulting
fusion interval may not contain the true value.
The chosen value of f introduces a trade-off between accuracy and precision of the
fusion interval. In particular, decreasing f will result in a smaller (i.e., more precise)
fusion interval in any given round. On the other hand, it may increase the proportion
of rounds where the fusion interval does not contain the true value (i.e., less accurate),
in which case a more conservative value of f would be required. Therefore, in this
section we provide a way of quantifying the effect of the value of f on the performance
of sensor fusion.
To formalize these statements, suppose that we are given a TFM for each sensor.
Since we consider a periodic system in which sensors are sampled at the same rate, in
this section we assume that window sizes are the same for all sensors, i.e., the TFM’s
have the form (i, ei, w). Define a global fault as a round in which there are more than
f faulty measurements. Recall that in such a case the fusion interval is not guaranteed
to contain the true value.
Definition 5.1 (Global Fault). Given the maximum number of faulty measurements
f , for any time t,
GF (t) ≡
(
n∑
i=1
F1(i, t)
)
> f. (4)
The goal is to find a global fault model (E,W )f for the entire system in which there are
at most E rounds with a global fault in any window of W rounds. The fault model will
determine how robust (and consequently, conservative) any filtering algorithm has to
be in order to produce a meaningful output. Note that the value of (E,W )f depends on
the sensors’ TFM but not on the actual sensor measurements, even if they are faulty;
hence, this result holds even in the presence of stealthy attacks that comply with the
sensors’ TFM.
Obtaining a closed-form solution for the values of E and W is made difficult by the
combinatorial nature of the problem. Therefore, we have derived an algorithm that,
given the TFM’s and f as input, outputs E and W . As formalized in Algorithm 1, it
computes the largest possible number of rounds in which at least f+1 faulty measure-
ments can occur; this is the largest number of rounds in which the fusion interval is not
guaranteed to contain the true value. Intuitively, at each round the algorithm “sched-
ules” faulty measurements for the sensors that have the largest number of “allowed”
faulty measurements until the end of the window.
THEOREM 5.2. The output, E, of Algorithm 1 is the largest number of global faults
possible in a window of size W .
PROOF. The proof of optimality mirrors the proof of optimality of the Earliest Dead-
line First (EDF) scheduling algorithm. Suppose there exists a schedule s that is better
than the proposed here. Then s contains a round t in which a sensor si produces a
2Only possible if all sensors have e > 0.
Algorithm 1 Computing the Global Fault Model of Sensor Fusion
Input: n transient fault models of the form (i, ei, w) and sensor fusion parameter f
1: WR ← w
2: ES ← order descending(
⋃
ei)
3: E ← 0
4: whileWR > 0 and ES(f + 1) > 0 do
5: for {i← 1; i ≤ f + 1; i← i+ 1} do
6: ES(i)← ES(i)− 1
7: end for
8: ES ← order descending(ES)
9: WR ←WR − 1
10: E ← E + 1
11: end while
12: W ← w
13: return (E,W )
faulty measurement and sensor sj does not, even though sj has more “unused” faulty
measurements.
Suppose sj ’s next scheduled faulty measurement according to s is at time k > t.
Without loss of generality, we can assume si does not have a faulty measurement at
k.3 Then by swapping sj and si’s faulty measurements, i.e. making si’s measurement
faulty at time k and sj ’s faulty at time t, we do not affect the magnitude of E (since
the number of faulty measurements in each round remains the same). By replacing all
such pairs we eventually transform s into a new schedule s′ that is exactly the schedule
suggested by the proposed algorithm here. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is optimal.
Note that Algorithm 1 is polynomial in the number of sensors, n, and is pseudo-
polynomial in the window size, w. At the same time, we note that it is executed offline,
at design stage, hence the execution time will not be prohibitive even for very large
window sizes. To inspect which choice of f is best suited for a given system, design-
ers need to take into account Algorithm 1 and its output. Comparing different pairs
(E,W )f may not always be possible in a quantitative way but an analysis similar to
that of Fig. 2 may be performed so that the best combination of accuracy vs. precision
is chosen.
5.2. Filtered Fusion Interval
In this subsection we describe how, given a pair (E,W )f and W rounds with a fusion
interval computed in each, one can derive a filtered fusion interval that is guaranteed
to contain the true value and is bounded in size. The filtered fusion interval can be
thought of as the system’s conservative, but correct, guess of its current state – since
it does not trust its last fusion interval, it examines the historical fusion intervals to
improve this estimate. To do this, we assume that the system has a known dynamical
model, up to additive noise, of the form:
xt+1 = g(xt) + wt, (5)
where x ∈ R denotes the system’s state (e.g., velocity), g(·) is the transition function
and w is bounded process noise, i.e., ‖w‖ ≤ M for some positive M . It is assumed that
each yi is a direct (possibly faulty) measurement of x.
3Since sj has more remaining faulty measurements, there exists a time k when sj provides a faulty mea-
surement and si does not. If no such time exists, then we can remove the “scheduled” faulty measurement
by si at time t and replace it with a faulty measurement by sj (still within its TFM).
Algorithm 2 Filtered Fusion Interval
Input: transition function g, an array FI containing W fusion intervals (in chronolog-
ical order) and a bound E on the number of global faults
1: FIC ← ∅
2: for {i← 1; i ≤W − 1; i← i+ 1} do
3: mapped I ← m(m(· · ·m(FI(i)))) // map i times
4: FIC .add(mapped I)
5: end for
6: FIC .add(FI(W ))
7: return sensor fusion(FIC , E)
Given this model, each fusion interval can be mapped from time t to t + 1 [Ivanov
et al. 2014b]. For instance, let I = [a, b]; then the mapping of I to the next round is
m(I) = {p | p = g(q) + n,∀q ∈ [a, b], |n| ≤M}.4 (6)
It is now possible to design an algorithm to compute the filtered fusion interval at time
t using the last W fusion intervals.
The proposed algorithm is formalized in Algorithm 2. Essentially, all fusion inter-
vals are mapped, using g, to the current time t, thus obtaining W intervals at t. Then
we apply the original sensor fusion algorithm – since at most E mapped intervals are
faulty, we output the smallest interval that contains all points that lie in at leastW−E
mapped intervals. Thus, a filtered fusion interval is computed that is a conservative,
but bounded, estimate of the system’s current state. Note that Algorithm 2 is polyno-
mial both in the number of sensors and the window size.
PROPOSITION 5.3. The complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(CW 2 +W logW ) where C is
the cost of the mapping function m. Constructing the input array FI is O((n log n)W )
where n is the number of sensors.
PROOF. First note that the mapping function m is called O(W 2) times (line 3 in-
side the loop). Additionally, computing the fusion interval in FIC (line 6) requires
O(W logW ) time (as shown in [Marzullo 1990], the sensor fusion algorithm takes
O(n log n) time, where n is the number of sensors).
As for the second claim, note that the cost of obtaining one element of FI is again
O(n log n), i.e., one run of the sensor fusion algorithm. Since the size of FI is W , the
claim follows.
It is important to note that Algorithm 2 can be computed even more efficiently by
noting that when calculating the filtered fusion interval at a given round, we can reuse
the result of the calculations of the previous round, i.e., only one round of interval
mappings needs to be performed.
We note that Algorithm 2 does not always produce the smallest possible interval
that is guaranteed to contain the true value. On other hand, as shown in the above
Proposition, it is efficient and can be implemented in real time whereas it is difficult to
obtain an algorithm that outputs such an interval and is not exponential in the number
of sensors and rounds. Finally, Algorithm 2’s output is guaranteed to contain the true
value and is bounded (provided E < dW/2e), so it is still in the spirit of worst-case
analysis.
4This definition is implicitly assuming g is continuous on the region [a, b]. If that is not true, the convex hull
of the mapping needs to be taken as well.
6. A SOUND ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
In this section we introduce attacks and describe our approach to their detection and
identification, which aims to differentiate sensor attacks from mere transient faults
given each sensor’s TFM. It is based on Pairwise Inconsistencies (PI’s) between two
sensors. Two types of PI’s are the key concepts of our approach: weak inconsistency
and strong inconsistency. We accumulate the information of strong inconsistencies
over time in order to utilize it for attack detection and identification. In the follow-
ing subsections, we first define each type of inconsistency and then present the attack
detection/identification method. We conclude with a discussion on the conditions on
the TFM parameters under which our approach can operate.
6.1. Weak and Strong Inconsistency
This section is built on the premise that the true value θ(t) is unknown in general.
Thus, it is not always known which sensors have provided correct measurements.
However, we know how correct sensor measurements should relate to each other, and
mainly use this mutual information in our approach. The first relation between two
sensors, si and sj , is weak inconsistency, denoted by the predicate WI(i, j, t). Two sen-
sors are weakly inconsistent in a given round if and only if one of them provides a
faulty measurement.
Definition 6.1 (Weak Inconsistency). For any sensor indices i and j, and any time t,
WI(i, j, t) ≡ F (i, t) ∨ F (j, t). (7)
We say that sensors i and j are weakly inconsistent at time t iff WI(i, j, t) holds.
Since weak inconsistency is defined upon the unknown true value θ(t), it is impossi-
ble to decide weak inconsistency in general. However, there exists a useful sufficient
condition. If the intervals of two sensors do not overlap each other, one of them must
have provided a faulty measurement because the true value cannot lie in both the
intervals. This condition is formally stated in the following lemma:
LEMMA 6.2. Given i, j and t,
|y(t)i − y(t)j | > i + j =⇒ WI(i, j, t) (8)
PROOF. Assume for a contradiction that both si and sj provide non-faulty measure-
ments at time t, i.e., there exists θ(t) satisfying |y(t)i − θ(t)| ≤ i and |y(t)j − θ(t)| ≤ j .
This implies that
|y(t)i − y(t)j | = |(y(t)i − θ(t))− (y(t)j − θ(t))| ≤
|y(t)i − θ(t)|+ |y(t)j − θ(t)| ≤ i + j
which contradicts the premise of the Lemma statement.
Note that both transient faults and attacks can cause weak inconsistency in a round.
Thus, to disambiguate between transient faults and attacks, we introduce another re-
lation between two sensors, namely strong inconsistency, denoted by the predicate
SI(i, j, t). Two sensors are strongly inconsistent if and only if one of them is non-
transiently faulty (i.e., it does not comply with its transient fault model).
Definition 6.3 (Strong Inconsistency). For any sensor indices i and j, and any time
t,
SI(i, j, t) ≡ NTF (i, t) ∨NTF (j, t) (9)
We say that sensors i and j are strongly inconsistent at time t iff SI(i, j, t) holds.
Similar to weak inconsistency, strong inconsistency cannot be decided in general. How-
ever, there exists a sufficient condition again. If two sensors are weakly inconsistent
more times than a certain threshold in a window, they become strongly inconsistent.
LEMMA 6.4. Given i, j, t, t′=t∑
t′=t−min(wi,wj)+1
WI1(i, j, t
′)
 > ei + ej =⇒ SI(i, j, t) (10)
PROOF. Note that a weak inconsistency at time t′ implies at least one sensor pro-
vides a faulty measurement at t′, hence the premise implies that the number of faulty
measurements in both sensors combined is also greater than ei + ej . This means that,
in a window of size min(wi, wj), either si has at least ei faulty measurements or sj
has at least ej faulty measurements. In turn, this implies that one of them must be
non-transiently faulty.
The notions of pairwise inconsistency in this subsection form a basis for the attack
detection and identification techniques to be explained in the following subsection.
6.2. Attack Detection and Identification
In this subsection, we describe our approach to attack detection/identification using
the notions of weak and strong inconsistency. An attack is detected when there ex-
ist two sensors which are strongly inconsistent because one of them must be non-
transiently faulty. An attacked sensor is identified if it is strongly inconsistent with
multiple sensors. These statements are formalized in the remainder of this subsection.
To propagate the strong inconsistencies over time, we use a sequential detection
approach (motivated by sequential detection theory [Wald 1973]) and accumulate the
information over time. We use the predicate SI∗(i, j) to denote that there exists a time
t ≤ T when sensors si and sj are strongly inconsistent.
Definition 6.5 (Accumulated SI). For any sensor indices i and j,
SI∗(i, j) ≡ ∃t ≤ T, SI(i, j, t), (11)
where T is the total time of the system’s operation.
Note that accumulated strong inconsistency between two sensors implies that one of
the two sensors is attacked.
LEMMA 6.6. Given si, sj
SI∗(i, j) =⇒ A(i) ∨A(j) (12)
PROOF. From the definition,
SI∗(i, j) ≡ ∃t, (NTF (i, t) ∨NTF (j, t)). This implies
(∃t,NTF (i, t)) ∨ (∃t,NTF (j, t)) =⇒ A(i) ∨A(j).
We now formalize attack detection using accumulated strong inconsistency; there
exists a sensor attack if any pair of sensors have ever been strongly inconsistent.
THEOREM 6.7. (∃i,∃j, SI∗(i, j)) =⇒ ∃i : A(i).
PROOF. Let si and sj be two sensors that satisfy SI∗(i, j). By Lemma 6.6, this means
A(i) ∨A(j), and the Theorem statement follows.
As the existence of strong inconsistency between two sensors cannot determine
which sensor is attacked, we now address the attack identification problem. Note that
it is necessary to assume that at most a sensors are attacked such that a < n − 1. To
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Fig. 3: The LandShark robot.
explain the need for the assumption, suppose that sensor si is strongly inconsistent
with all other sensors. Without the assumption on a, it is impossible to declare that
si is attacked because si could be correct and all other sensors could be attacked, or
vice versa. For this reason, when a ≥ n− 1, there can exist no detector which correctly
identifies attacks based on pairwise comparisons alone.
When a < n− 1, there is a sufficient condition for identifying attacked sensors.
THEOREM 6.8. Let d(i) denote the size of set {j | SI∗(i, j)}, i.e., the number of sen-
sors that have been strongly inconsistent with si during the system’s operation. Then,
assuming a < n− 1,
d(i) > a =⇒ A(i). (13)
PROOF. Suppose for a contradiction that si is not attacked. It follows that the
d(i) > a sensors which are strongly inconsistent with si must be attacked. This is a
contradiction because there are at most a attacks.
Next, we note that there exists a constraint on the TFM parameters governing the
feasibility of our PI-based approach. The following lemma provides a sufficient condi-
tion for the impossibility of attack detection by the PI-based method:
LEMMA 6.9. If ei + ej ≥ min(wi, wj) for all distinct i and j, then no attack can be
detected by our approach.
PROOF. Note that the premise implies that no strong inconsistency can be found
between any pair of sensors. This is true because even if si and sj are weakly inconsis-
tent in each round, it is possible that the measurements of si were faulty in the first ei
rounds and correct in the remaining ones, while the measurements of sj were correct
initially and faulty in the last ej rounds. In this way both sensors would be within their
TFM’s, and one cannot conclude that an attack exists.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the soundness of the developed attack detec-
tion/identification approach.
PROPOSITION 6.10. The attack detection/identification methods proposed in Theo-
rems 6.7 and 6.8 are sound. In other words, the algorithms are raise no false alarm
(assuming the transient fault model parameters are correctly specified).
PROOF. The claim follows from the fact that both Theorems provide sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of an attack.
7. CASE STUDY
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the different aspects proposed in this
work through a case study on the LandShark robotic platform [Black-I Robotics 2015]
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(a) Sensor 1: Left Encoder
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Fig. 4: Empirical plots of the proportion of faults in a window (e/w) against the error
bound ().
Table I: Fault models for the sensors on LandShark
Detector L. Encoder R. Encoder GPS
 e  e  e
SF 0.26 n.a. 0.32 n.a. 0.48 n.a.
PI10 0.229 2 0.234 2 0.295 2
PI30 0.195 6 0.207 6 0.19 9
PI50 0.195 11 0.199 11 0.19 9
PI100 0.131 26 0.168 22 0.19 9
PI200 0.117 36 0.126 37 0.19 10
shown in Fig. 3. The LandShark is an electric unmanned ground vehicle, which con-
tains various sensors including left and right wheel encoders and a GPS unit. Each of
these sensors can be filtered to provide a velocity measurement at a rate of 10 Hz. Thus,
we use the redundancy of velocity measurements to evaluate the proposed techniques
in the presence of transient faults (e.g., tire slip).
7.1. Transient Fault Model Parameter Selection
This subsection illustrates the selection of the TFM parameters following the method
described in Section 4. First, we collect the training data by driving the LandShark
straight at a constant speed of 1 m/s on the different surfaces such as grass, asphalt
and snow, where the environment may cause transient faults (e.g., slipping tires would
mean encoders provide higher-than-actual velocity). The gathered training data corre-
sponds to 2400 velocity measurements by each sensor at 10 Hz (i.e., about four min-
utes). By examining the training data, we obtain Fig. 4, which is the real-data equiva-
lent of Fig. 2.
Table I summarizes the chosen parameters, where PIw represents the setup of our
Pairwise Inconsistency (PI)-based approach which uses a window size w for all three
sensors and w is varied between 10, 30, 50, 100 and 200. For example, for w = 50 in
GPS (Fig. 4c), the knee point appears around  = 0.19 and e/w = 0.18, corresponding to
e = 9. Note that the knee points are more clearly visible as the window size increases.
Finally, we note that the original sensor fusion (SF) approach would use the most
conservative error bounds (interval sizes) because it is designed for the worst case.
Specifically, in Fig. 4, we select the smallest  such that no faulty measurements can
be observed (e.g., 0.48 for GPS). Note that the parameters for SF would be equivalent
to PI1. We observe that one benefit of using TFM is that as the window size increases,
the size of error bounds is generally reduced, thus allowing more precise sensor fusion
(e.g., PI200 is more than twice smaller than SF in the size of error bounds).
Table II: Sensor fusion performance for different f . E (Eˆ) is the theoretical (empirical)
worst-case number of rounds with global faults. FI is the average size of correct fusion
intervals.
PIw
f = 0 f = 1
E Eˆ FI E Eˆ FI
PI10 6 (60%) 6 (60%) 0.428 3 (30%) 2 (20%) 0.482
PI30 21 (70%) 9 (30%) 0.329 10 (33%) 3 (10%) 0.397
PI50 31 (62%) 9 (18%) 0.325 15 (30%) 3 (6%) 0.391
PI100 57 (57%) 36 (36%) 0.248 28 (28%) 8 (8%) 0.318
PI200 83 (42%) 68 (34%) 0.211 41 (21%) 27 (14%) 0.263
Table III: Average size of filtered fusion interval for different values for f and noise
bound M .
PIw
f = 0 f = 1
M = 0.005 M = 0.001 M = 0.005 M = 0.001
PI10 0.504 0.466 0.499 0.466
PI30 0.545 0.400 0.493 0.397
PI50 0.635 0.403 0.540 0.399
PI100 0.815 0.366 0.598 0.358
PI200 1.036 0.371 0.673 0.334
Table IV: Average running time (in microsecond) of filtered fusion for different values
for f and noise bound M .
PIw
f = 0 f = 1
M = 0.005 M = 0.001 M = 0.005 M = 0.001
PI10 33 35 34 35
PI30 38 39 44 43
PI50 43 47 43 48
PI100 57 54 50 56
PI200 72 87 72 86
7.2. Sensor Fusion Performance
We now examine the effect of TFM on sensor fusion performance employing the TFM
parameters selected above. Note that no attacks have been introduced yet. As dis-
cussed in Section 5, there exists a trade-off between the precision and the accuracy of
the fusion interval depending on the choice of f . Thus, we evaluate these metrics using
the LandShark data and the selected TFM parameters for different window sizes.
To do this, we proceed as follows: we first collect test data from 17 runs of the Land-
Shark, each consisting of about 500 velocity measurements by each sensor at 10 Hz.
The true value is obtained in the same way as the one in the training data. Varying f
between 0 and 1,5 we perform sensor fusion at each round of the test data and check
whether the fusion interval contains the true value (i.e., there is a global fault). Then
we compute the worst number of rounds (denoted by Eˆ) with global faults in a win-
dow and compare that with the theoretical bound E computed by Algorithm 1 given
the TFM parameters for each sensor. In addition, we calculate the average size of the
correct fusion intervals for each setup (denoted by FI).
Table II shows the performance results, where in addition to the absolute values of E
and Eˆ, we show their proportion of the window size in a percentage. Eˆ is never larger
than E but is sometimes equal, hence the worst case is indeed observed in reality. At
5The case of f = 2 is excluded because n = 3, and, in that case, the fusion interval cannot be bounded in
general.
Table V: False alarm rate
Detector SF PI10 PI50 PI200
False Alarm
Rate(%) 0.06 0.64 0.00 0.00
the same time, as the window size increases, the analytical worst-case becomes less
tight. Furthermore, as f increases, so does the average size of fusion interval, but
the number of worst-case global faults decreases. Regardless of the choice of f , both
metrics generally improve with window size. The reason is that the TFM for a bigger
window tends to have a smaller error bound (resulting in better precision) as well as a
smaller (e/w) ratio (resulting in better accuracy).
In addition, we also computed the filtered fusion interval at each round for the dif-
ferent setups. Since a constant input was used to drive the LandShark, the vehicle’s
state does not change except for process noise. Since the noise is not known exactly, we
used two different bounds to compute the filtered fusion interval. Table III presents
the average size of the filtered fusion interval for the two values of f and for noise
bounds equal to either 0.005 m/s or 0.001 m/s. For larger values of the noise, the pro-
posed filtering algorithm does not perform very well with large windows due to the
increased uncertainty that it introduces. Yet, for the smaller noise bound using larger
windows is still more beneficial for the system. Since the filtered fusion interval always
contains the true value and its size is not significantly larger than the average size of
the fusion interval in a given round, we argue that systems with small noise should
utilize the filtered fusion interval as a correct conservative estimate of their state.
Lastly, to analyze the time overhead of Algorithm 2 which calculates the filtered
fusion interval, we measured the average running time of one round of the filter fusion
for the different setups.6 Table IV shows that although the running time increases
with the window size W , the time overhead is negligible overall (considering that the
sensors’ sampling frequency is 10Hz).
7.3. Attack Detection Performance
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the attack detectors for the selected
TFM parameters employing various attack scenarios explained below. We use the same
test data mentioned in the previous subsection.
We first evaluate the false alarm rates of the attack detectors; the false alarm rate
is calculated as the number of incorrect alarms over the total number of tests. Note
that all raised alarms are considered to be incorrect because no attacks are present
yet. We perform the first test as soon as w measurements are available; consequently,
whenever a new measurement arrives from each sensor, a new test is performed using
the last w measurements. Table V shows the false alarm rates for the TFM parameters
of Table I.7 The results show that for window sizes 200 and 50, the false alarm rate is
zero, but it is non-zero for window sizes 10 and 1 (i.e., the SF-based detector). The
reason is that the false alarms result from transient faults and they do not appear
too often in larger windows. On the other hand, the SF-based approach has a low
false alarm rate because it uses conservative error bounds; it raises some false alarms
because the largest faulty measurement observed in the training data was less than
the one in the test data.
We now evaluate the attack detection rate assuming that only one (unknown to
us) out of the three sensors is attacked. We consider three different attack scenarios:
6The running time was measured on a machine with the 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 processor.
7PI30 and PI100 are excluded for the rest of the paper to avoid clutter.
Table VI: Detection rate
Detector SF PI10 PI50 PI200
Biased Attack 62.74 99.74 100 100
Random Attack 4.91 36.10 93.30 100
Greedy Attack 0 0.4817 0 0
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Fig. 5: Time to detection plots under the three classes of attacks.
(1) bias attack; (2) random attack; (3) greedy attack. The bias attack adds a constant
of 0.8 m/s to the attacked sensor. The random attack adds a uniformly distributed
random noise between 0 and 0.8 m/s.8. The greedy attack replaces the measurement of
the attacked sensor with a specially crafted measurement designed to maximize the
uncertainty (i.e., the fusion interval size) in the system; this is also a stealthy attack
as discussed in [Ivanov et al. 2014a].9 Note that the attack is present in every round
in the detection rate test, thus all raised alarms are true alarms.
To evaluate the attack detection rate, we employ the same test data as above and
augment it by simulating each attack scenario described above. Table VI summarizes
the detection rates for each detector and attack scenario. The detection rate improves
in general as the window size increases. The only exception is greedy attack, where
most of the detectors raise no alarms. This indicates that given enough knowledge and
computational power, the attacked sensor can pretend as if it is a correct one while
it negatively affects the system. Note that the SF-based approach’s detection rate is
lower than the PI-based one’s because it uses conservative error bounds.
Note that the false alarm rate improves with window size, whereas, for the same rea-
son, the attack detectors with a large window size may be slow to detect attacks. There-
fore, we also evaluate the detection rate vs. the elapsed time since the attack begins.
The results for the various TFM parameters are shown in Fig. 5, where the steady-
state detection rates correspond to the detection rates in Table VI. Fig. 5c shows that
all detectors rarely detect any greedy attacks. From the cases of biased and random at-
tacks, Fig. 5 shows that the steady-state detection rate improves with window size, and
the time needed to reach the steady-state detection level increases only marginally.
To compare the attack detectors in greater depth and to examine their robustness
to the choice of the TFM parameters, we vary the error bounds of the TFM parame-
ters selected in Section 7.1. Specifically, varying  of each sensor from 50% to 150% of
their magnitudes, we calculate the false alarm rate and detection rate for each setup.
By examining the robustness of attack detector regarding the TFM parameters, we
8The magnitudes of the bias and random attacks are selected to be roughly as large as the interval size of
the most imprecise sensor (i.e., GPS).
9We assume the greedy attack knows the other abstract measurements, as possible if sensor communication
occurs on a shared medium, e.g., CAN bus.
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Fig. 6: Detection Rate vs. False Alarm Rate under the three classes of attacks. Dotted
black lines denote 45◦ lines. Solid lines connect points for a clearer presentation. Note
the scale is different in the greedy attack case.
can qualitatively demonstrate the importance of accurate parameter selection. The re-
sults for the varied TFM parameters for each window size are depicted as the receiver
operator characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 6, which is a classical way to measure a
detector’s performance. Note that the 45◦ line is a dotted line and is moved lower to
make comparative performance clear.10
Note that data points which trend towards the upper left corner indicate a better
detector because the detector would have a larger detection rate and a smaller false
alarm rate [Wald 1973]. We can qualitatively evaluate that one detector is more robust
than another if the ROC data points cluster nearer to the upper left corner when vary-
ing its parameters [Wald 1973]. Therefore, the robustness of the PI-based detectors
improves with window size in general. Note that PI10 performs marginally better than
the SF-based detector, and PI200 and PI50 apparently outperform the others. Lastly,
the ROC curves for the greedy attack scenario lie on the 45◦ line, which implies that
when the most powerful attacker is present, the performance of the attack detectors is
not better than a coin flip.
The results presented in this section suggest that the false alarm rate, the detection
rate and the robustness of PI-based detectors improve with window size, at a cost of a
marginal increase of time-to-detection. In addition, the PI-based detector outperforms
the SF-based one as the window size increases.
Finally, we only briefly highlight the attack identification performance because it
shows the almost identical result to the detection one. Note that in general, the iden-
tification rate also improves with window size, experiencing only a marginal increase
in time-to-identification.
7.4. Simulations on Larger Systems
Thus far in this section, our case study has evaluated our method on a real system with
three sensors, as constrained by the LandShark system. This subsection further eval-
uates our method on simulated systems with a larger number of sensors. To do this, we
simulate 200 random systems and generate test measurement data. Each simulated
system has 15 sensors; their TFM parameters are duplicates of the LandShark’s three
sensors’ in Table I (different combinations the three TFM models were used in each
of the 200 systems). The test data is thus generated to conform to the transient fault
model for the correct sensors; in addition, for each system, seven sensors were ran-
domly chosen to be attacked. As in the case of the LandShark system, the same three
10Only 13 points are used to show the general trend and avoid overcrowding.
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Fig. 7: Time to detection plots under the three classes of attacks on the simulated
systems.
0 20 40 60 80 100
False Alarm Rate (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
De
te
cti
on
 R
at
e 
(%
)
SF
PI10
PI50
PI200
(a) Constant attack.
0 20 40 60 80 100
False Alarm Rate (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
De
te
cti
on
 R
at
e 
(%
)
SF
PI10
PI50
PI200
(b) Random attack.
0 20 40 60 80 100
False Alarm Rate (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
De
te
cti
on
 R
at
e 
(%
)
SF
PI10
PI50
PI200
(c) Greedy attack.
Fig. 8: Detection Rate vs. False Alarm Rate under the three classes of attacks on the
simulated systems. Dotted black lines denote 45◦ lines. Solid lines connect points for a
clearer presentation.
types of attacks (i.e., bias, random, greedy attacks) are used. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the
detection results on the simulated systems, averaging over all of the test cases.
Similar to the real-data case, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show that the PI-based approach
greatly outperforms the SF-based one. Furthermore, we observe the same trends of
better performance for larger-window detectors at the cost of mildly longer time to
detection. A notable difference can be seen in the greedy attack case, where it is now
possible for some of PI-based approaches to detect the attack. This is most likely due to
the fact that it is more difficult for the attacker to remain undetected in a system with
more sensors where more pairwise inconsistencies are possible during each round.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the security of CPS with redundant sensors, some of
which can be attacked while others may be transiently faulty. Employing TFM’s, we
presented an algorithm to detect and identify sensor attacks in the presence of tran-
sient faults. Since reliable TFM parameters may not be given by manufacturers, we
provided a method to identify such parameters from training data. We examined the
effect of TFM on sensor fusion performance, and provided an algorithm to find the fil-
tered fusion interval which is guaranteed to contain the true value. These approaches
were evaluated on real data from a robotic platform. For future work, we plan to en-
hance the detection method by incorporating a system’s dynamical model (currently
only used for the filtered fusion interval).
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